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In paragraph 84 of the Working Paper on Offences against the Person (1976) the Criminal Law Revision Committee state: 'We think the present law is objectionable in that there has to be a charge and conviction of murder in mercy killing cases, unless there is evidence of diminished responsibility, although the defendant may in fact serve a very short prison sentence'. In the submission from the Council ofSt Christopher's Hospice to the Law Revision Committee we rejected the proposal for a new offence of 'mercy killing' as equally objectionable in that it would 'if not encourage, at least acquiesce in and perpetuate the idea of a wrong remedy for an ill remediable by better means'.
Later in our submission we were bold enough to state: 'we believe that the proposal would make bad law' -a statement we expanded on with particular reference to the difficulty of judging (and I use the word advisedly) the motive and the degree of 'compassion' in any particular case. As to whether the proposal would make 'bad law' I personally am not qualified to argue. But as to whether I should speak or stay silent an analogy may tell.
The professions concerned with 'care' must present their case to the profession concerned with 'law' and trust that the experts, having distinguished between expediency and true expertise, will translate into sound law the evidence that is put before them. Here I stand on very much firmer ground. We believe that the concept of 'mercy killing' acquiesces in the wrong remedy for an ill remediable by better means. In our particular case we base this statement on ten years of active care in the control of the pains of terminal disease; I myself have been involved for almost half this time. In ten years St Christopher's Hospice has cared for over 5000 patients, the great majority of whom have been referred to us for the control of uncontrolled pain -and not of physical pain alone: criteria for admission to the Hospice include unresolved mental, social and spiritual pains as well.
Case history
I admitted Mrs 0 to St Christopher's from a local hospital on the 19 May 1977. She had an inoperable carcinoma of the pancreas with secondary deposits in the liver. She was in severe pain. The medical student with me was appalled at her suffering.
On the application form was written 'She does not know she has carcinoma'. On questioning she said to me 'When you have pain for a year you start to think!' Of course she knew. She had had a very sad marriage. By listening to her story and observing her carefully a correct assessment was made of the physical and the mental components of her pain and the correct drugs were prescribed. Within a few days she admitted that the pain was under control for the first time for a year. She did not remain completely pain-free. But each Monday she had her hair washed and set, each Thursday she visited our weekly bar, and each Sunday she came to chapel. The ward staff soon learned that with meticulous attention to her drugs, and with even more meticulous attention to herself, when pain did break through, it could almost always be alleviated.
She was with us just under 3 months. Her last few days were peaceful and pain-free and she died surrounded by three faithful friends, the ward sister and a nurse. A few days later one of her friends wrote: 'When I visited her in a previous hospital she was like a demented animalconsumed with pain ... I was very frightened, not knowing how to cope ... I saw her in St Christopher's restored to the dignity of a calm rational human being ... from then on I was able to remain with her for hours, instead of minutes ... discussing things dear to her heart ... By so doing I, too, have gained in spiritual strength.' 'Mercy killing' might well have been appropriate for 'a demented animal'. It did not even have to be considered for 'a calm human being'.
Much of what I now have to say is based on an Address entitled 'Moral problems facing the medical profession at the present time', written by the late Lord Bishop of Durham, Ian Ramsey, and read at the Annual Clinical Meeting of the British Medical Association in April 1972.
Bishop Ramsey wrote:
'What has happened is that certain situations which are in outline what they have always been, have now changed radically in detail. For instance, medical treatment to save and prolong life; the need and the duty to ease pain; the conception and birth of a child these are all situations which, overall and in outline, are the same as they have always been.' 'Situations may be the same in outline .. and therefore be supposed to yield broadly to traditional morality, and more particularly to the traditional code of professional behaviour. But their detail is infinitely more complicated, and this means that the old rules for dealing with these situations are far too large-scale to do justice to the new detail. It is as though we tried to catch sprats in the net of a trawler!'
The Bishop suggested that if we looked back at medical papers written in simpler times we might filter out such presuppositions, implicit as well as explicit, as those that follow: that life must be preserved; that patients have a right to control their own lives; that comparisons can be made between different people's lives in terms of quality; that medical research should proceed unhindered; that suffering must be avoided; that death is failure. In a series of logical (and acceptable) moves the Bishop, starting with that most commonly cited medical-moral principle 'respect for life' enlarges this concept to 'respect for human life in society'. This is a fascinating and fundamental progress. The social dimension -family and society at large -is neglected at our peril. None of us is an island and we do not adequately respect a person's life unless we respect the lives of those other people who have constituted the community in which his life has been largely lived, and in which it has developed.
A woman with melanomatosis tried to commit suicide by throwing herself out of a window; she failed to kill herself. In the terminal stage of the disease she became our patient. She told us that after the suicide attempt one of her teen-age children said 'You can't have loved us very much if you wanted so badly to leave us'. Because she did live out her life to the full that family is now managing well.
Having considered the principle of 'respect for human life in society' Bishop Ramsey then makes his final move and points out that, closely connected with such problems as organ transplants, kidney machines or highly artificial means of keeping people alive, we are forced to see that what matters about life is not only or importantly its duration, but its value. So the original principle must be further expanded to read 'respect for human life of a certain quality in society'. Situations will and do arise when judgments will have to be made about the quality, and the potential quality, of one man's life against that of another. With one kidney machine available and needed, how should I, for example, judge between the value, or the potential value, of a doctor and a Lord Justice? We know some people who are unquestionably dead; equally we know some people who are undoubtedly alive. But immediately one brings in a continuum, though it may be easy to see differences at the extremes, in the middle it is more difficult.
For myself one of the strongest arguments I know against euthanasia is the good use that I have seen patients and their families make of the time after the pains have been controlled and before death finally occurs. To be denied such a time by an act of 'mercy killing', instead of relying on good medical practice to alleviate the ills, would be to deprive the family, and society, of that unique value that is concentrated in any human life.
Is good medical practice in this field universally available? Unfortunately not. But that is not all the answer. Centres like St Christopher's are being built, and prayed for (and fought for) all over this country and indeed are spreading over the world. Variations on the theme of hospice care have been established and are working, not only as separate units or in the domiciliary field but also within big hospitals, either as a special ward or as a team of specialists -doctors, nurses, social workers, chaplain -available for consultation whenever and wherever the pains of incurable disease call for the special skills that such a team possess. A team of this kind began work at St Thomas' Hospital, London, in January 1978.
At the 800-bedded St Luke's Hospital, New York, they have set up what could be described as a symptom control team: 2 doctors, 2 nurses, a social worker and a chaplain, available for consultation throughout the hospital in any problem associated with terminal illness. Visiting there last year I was asked to see Robert. Arriving on the ward with the team we were greeted by the ward staff with 'We've certainly got problems with him'. Robert had an osteogenic sarcoma with gross involvement of the left femur and hip. He was 23, black, an ex-Vietnam soldier, with a white girl-friend who was pregnant. His own parents would not visit him. He Was on maximum doses of methadone (incorrectly administered), he was sweating with pain, unable to put a foot to the ground, and desperate. I doubt that a doctor had dared to touch him for several weeks. After shaking his hand and examining him I assured him that his pain could be controlled. The team then went to consult with his doctors and the ward staff.
By rationalizing his analgesics and adding phenylbutazone for the bony component of his pain and steroids for the inflammatory component, we enabled Robert to walk within 2 days. In a week he was able to walk out of the hospital to attend his father's funeral in North Carolina. He had to be readmitted within a month, and he died a few weeks later. Those who knew him well wrote: 'Colour, education, class distinctions faded away in the face of courage and humility. There was acceptance at the end -a willingness to have it go either way. His concern was not for himself but for those who were closest to him.' I saw Robert for 20 minutes. I cannot recall ever seeing anyone for whom mercy killing would have seemed more appropriate. For Robert and those around him how good it was that he lived to the full the life that was left.
Conclusion
I submit that no new definition of 'mercy killing' will get round the basic truth that mercy is good but killing is bad. What is needed is not more law but codes of practice worked over by trans-disciplinary groups (not committees) functioning in the same sort of way that we at St Christopher's are beating out a code of practice in the good use of narcotics for the relief of pain. Perhaps the Royal Colleges should be working on codes which involve not only the doctor and the nurse, but also the social worker and the chaplain, and which do not stop there: the most important yardstick for the success of such a venture is the involvement, trust and peace of mind of the patient and his family. This, thank God (for I speak as a Christian), we repeatedly achieve and see achieved in ever-widening circles.
I believe a new offence 'mercy killing', would achieve nothing except to drive a further wedge of distrust between all parties involved. I believe the ills for which 'mercy killing' might be prescribed (and I use that word advisedly too -what starts off as a possibility will only too easily be turned into a duty) can almost always be alleviated by skill and compassion. The skills are available; therefore neither will the motives have to be judged nor the compassion be measured.
